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CONSUMERISM'S FORGOTTEN MAN
Many writers have ably demonstrated that equal enforcement of stat-
utes may work unequal hardships on people of different economic strata.1
The failure to recognize that all people cannot be protected by the same
laws has produced statutes that, though they treat all citizens equally,
actually aid only a limited class and are almost useless, or even harmful,
to those who most need protection.2 New York's Home Solicitation Sales
Act' of 1970 seems to be such a statute.
Designed as a means of protecting consumers against the overbearing
and unscrupulous techniques notoriously associated with door-to-door
sales, 4 the statute creates a three-day period in which a consumer may
disavow specific types of contracts made during a door-to-door sales
transaction. 5
Although the act aids the consumer, it is useful only in limited cir-
cumstances. Partly because of the limited approach of the statute, but
to a much greater degree because of the failure of its authors to recog-
nize the special problems of different groups preyed upon in door-to-door
sales, the statute does not sufficiently protect those most vulnerable to
abuse.
1. "Fair-on-their face statutes, such as a levy of a poll tax as a condition of
voting will not vary that result. Uniform bail schedules lay a heavier burden on
the poor than on the well-to-do. . . . The same hardship results from use of a
uniform fine schedule for traffic violations and other misdemeanors. Laws which
penalize owners who are unable to secure and maintain public liability and prop-
erty damage insurance on their automobiles hit the poor hard and fall with a
heavy hand on proportionately more Negroes than whites. There are many situa-
tions in which classification does not seem to rest on poverty but in which eco-
nomics intrudes. Thus it has been said that the application of juvenile delinquency
statutes is 'heavily weighted against the poor family.'" L. Miller, Race, Poverty,
and the Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 386, 395-96 (1966). See A. Downs, Who Are the
Urban Poor? 42 (1968).
2. "The law in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." Anatole France,
Le Lys Rouge, as quoted in P.I. Birzon, R. Kasanof, and J. Forma, The Right to
Counsel and the Indigent Accused in Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York
State, 14 Buff. L. Rev. 428 (1965).
3. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 425-30 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
4. See D. Caplovitz, The Problems of the Poor Consumer: A Sociologist's
Viewpoint, in Ohio State Legal Serv. Ass'n Course on Law and Poverty: The Con-
sumer 1.01-.06 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Caplovitz, Problems].
5. The Home Solicitation Sales Act, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 427(1) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1972).
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This comment will analyse the Home Solicitation Sales Act in terms
of the special needs of the low income consumer and will suggest an addi-
tional statutory approach to protect consumers of lower economic strata.
The Low Income Consumer
The consumer movement is essentially characterized by "a history of
sporadic responses to a broad need that has been met for the most part
on a crisis rather than a sustained basis." Statutes promulgated to date
generally do not directly attack the abuses themselves, but instead give
the consumer an opportunity to deal more knowledgeably with the abuses
that exist.7 These laws are predicated on the model of a careful, literate,
sophisticated consumer in a free marketplace-in essence a rational
man.' This model may assume a level of consumer education that often
does not exist among those preyed upon in door-to-door sales.9 In addi-
tion, the traditional economic structure of the low income consumer both
causes and is reinforced by a dependence on credit-a vital prerequisite
for many transactions entered into by such consumers1 ° and a traditional
means of financing door-to-door sales.11
6. Product Safety in Household Goods 2 (F.R. Dickerson ed. 1968). For
example, "[e]nactment of legislation relating to credit arrangements has not fol-
lowed the pattern of expansion of the market. Regulation has been devised on an
ad hoc basis to take care of problems and abuses or to clarify relationships as the
need for such regulation became apparent . . . ." B. Curran, Trends in Consumer
Credit Legislation 3 (1965).
7. "The most significant new legislation proposals have been informational."
Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 Yale L.J. 745, 747 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as The Poor]. "Of all the aims of the consumer movement, the
one that I think can be of greatest benefit to competitive enterprise is the objective
of more and better information for buyers. The reason is grounded in simple
economics- the better informed the consumer, the more competitive business
must be on price and quality." M. Stans, The Issues and Challenges, The Chal-
lenge of Consumerism 2 (1971).
8. "Devoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not one single saving vice,
sans prejudice, procrastination, il-nature, avarice, and absence of mind, as careful
for his own safety as he is for that of others, this excellent but odious character
stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to his fellow
citizens to order their lives after his own example." A.P. Herbert, Uncommon
Law: Fardell v. Potts, as quoted in M. Frances McNamara, 2,000 Famous Legal
Quotations 492 (1967).
9. See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra.
10. "The key to the marketing system in low-income areas lies in special
adaptations of the institution of credit. The many merchants who locate in these
areas and find it profitable to do so are prepared to offer credit in spite of the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Denied access to the middle-class institutions of the credit card, the
charge account, and loans from banks, the underprivileged must rely on
the credit established by interpersonal relationships and the willingness
of merchants and door-to-door salesmen to extend credit to those thought
by conventional lenders to be unsuitably high credit risks.1  The mer-
chants, of course, cover their risks by charging prices clearly higher than
those found in the marketplace at large."3
At the same time, the poor are far more susceptible to the deceptive
practices that flourish under a credit system. As David Caplovitz has
stated:
The middleclasses use installment credit even more frequently than the poor,
but partly because they are financially more competent and partly because they
are more sophisticated as consumers, they are not nearly as likely as the poor to
encounter the merchant's fraud and deception and the oppressive biases in our
laws which favor the rights of creditors over the rights of debtors.1 4
The Door-to-Door Sale-A Description
The door-to-door sale has had a long tradition in American economic
life. It has contributed and continues to provide needed flexibility of dis-
tribution and ease of access in the economic structure. The realization
that this type of sale needs strict regulation does not conflict with a
recognition of the utility of the procedure. "Although. the device of door-
to-door selling is a well-accepted and bona fide method of merchandising,
it is susceptible to abuses by unscrupulous persons. tm
The abuses of door-to-door selling are numerous and widespread and
have led legislators to strict regulation in the area.
The dogged, tenacious and sometimes pugnacious determination with
which salesmen have literally flung themselves through residential portals
high risks involved. Moreover, their credit is tailored to the particular needs of the
low-income consumer." D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More 15 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Caplovitz].
11. "The need for credit, and the restricted sales outlets available ... often...
work to turn sales and loan agreements into primarily contracts of adhesion, with
all rights stacked in favor of the seller or creditor." Statement of Paul G. Bower,
FTC National Consumer Protection Hearings 360-61 (1968).
12. D. Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 144 (1965).
13. "This misuse of the door-to-door sales technique often results in unduly
heavy credit burdens on persons who cannot afford them, particularly among resi-
dents of urban poverty areas." Exec. Memo. [1970] McKinney's Sess. Laws of
N.Y., 2899.
14. Caplovitz, Problems, supra note 4, at 1.02.
15. Governor's Message [1970] McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y., 3092.
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and at householders, the transient nature of their principal place of busi-
ness, their financial irresponsibility in many instances, and an early and
very general tendency to defraud the unwary must have borne consider-
able weight upon the minds of those who have been instrumental in put-
ting such regulatory legislation upon the statute and ordinance books of
our states and municipalities." 6
The circumstances surrounding door-to-door sales give free rein to de-
ceptive and unfair sales techniques. As Ronald C. C. Cuming noted,
"none of these is necessarily peculiar to door-to-door selling; however,
by its very nature, this type of selling provides unusually fertile ground
for their development. 17
The intrusion into a person's home in itself gives the seller an advan-
tage. Once the salesman is inside the home, there is no way, barring the
drastic and possibly dangerous step of throwing the man out or calling
the police, that a housewife can get rid of an insistent salesman. A real
element of compulsion therefore exists in the home sales transaction."8
The security afforded by the possibility of escaping behind locked doors
frequently provides a psychological uplift to a buyer's sales resistance.
Once the salesman is behind the locked door and that retreat is no longer
available, the buyer is less likely to be as clearly in control of the trans-
action, and decisions are thus more apt to be colored by a lowering of
the security-based ability to resist. 0 Another major disadvantage to the
consumer in transacting business through door-to-door sales is the lack
of previous comparative shopping. The lack of mobility2" and the pauc-
ity of discount stores in lower-class neighborhoods2' generally give the
16. J.R. Sawyer, Federal Restraint on the States' Power to Regulate House-to-
House Selling, 6 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 85, 87 (1934).
17. R. Cuming, Consumer Protection-The Itinerant Seller, 32 Sask. L. Rev.
113, 114 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Cuming].
18. "This technique is very effective when used against housewives who are
physically unable to assert their freedom from a seller and who are actually afraid
that, if he is displeased, he may cause physical harm to them or their families." Id.
at 115.
19. For an interesting explication of the desirability on the part of the sales-
man to achieve psychological dominance over the sales target, see E. Lifshey,
Door-to-Door Selling (1948).
20. Caplovitz, supra note 10, at 53-56.
21. "The consumer who is able to shop near his home in chain stores in low-
income neighborhoods in Washington, D.C. generally pays comparable prices for
comparable items to those sold in medium income areas. . . .Large numbers of
poor families have no supermarkets near them and can exercise no choice: they
are obliged to buy in stores with limited supplies and high prices." M. Morris,
1972]
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shopping poor little basis for comparison. In a door-to-door sale, more-
over, no opportunity to compare prices presents itself since the buyer
frequently does not expect the arrival of the salesman. 2 This destroys an
important buyer defense.
Finally, there is the problem of the transient nature of the door-to-door
sales transaction. An individual who sells door-to-door need have no
fixed place of business, no ties in any community, no means of repairing
products that do not work, and little need of enticing repeat business.
23
Thus there is little assurance of quality, and perhaps real detriment to
the salesman who does provide quality goods, for the higher the price,
the more resistance must be overcome. In addition, the transient char-
acter of the salesman's trade makes the establishment of a reputation
unimportant. He acts without fear of damage to his business reputation
and with the knowledge that fraud is at best difficult to prove.24
Even in those situations in which a seller does have ties to the buyer-
as, for example, in the continuing relationships that grow up in a ghetto
-these ties tend to be based on the economic requirements of the buyer
who is often less concerned with the quality of the items he buys than in
obtaining credit in order to buy them at all.2 5
Grocery Shopping in Washington, D.C., 1-2 (1966), as quoted in C. Bell, The
Economics of the Ghetto 142 (1970). "In Harlem there is only one large depart-
ment store. . . ." K. Clark, The Social Dynamics of the Ghetto, in Aspects of
Poverty 59 (B. Seligman ed. 1968).
22. "The American housewife is an intelligent buyer, no matter what some
folks say about her much-heralded extravagance. The greatest safeguard she has
in buying-and she knows this very well-is in shopping around from store to
store, comparing values and styles and all the other salient points.
This shopping impulse arises the moment she considers buying anything, and the
house-to-house salesman must stifle it, if he can. He is giving his customer no
opportunity to compare values or to postpone buying. 'Do it now,' he tells her, 'I
won't be back this way for a couple of months.' She buys, when she buys, against
an inner voice of discretion which tells her to wait until she can compare values."
A.C. Fuller, Where Are We Headed in House-to-House Selling?, 52 Magazine of
Business 703, 705 (1927), quoted in The Poor, supra note 7, at 781.
23. Cuming, supra note 17, at 116.
24. M. Shanker, Consumer Protection Under Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Ohio State Legal Serv. Ass'n Course on Law and Poverty: The
Consumer 4.16 (1968).
25. ". . . [Merchants] can sell inferior goods at high prices because, in their
own words, the customers are not 'price and quality conscious.' Interviews found
that the merchants perceive their customers as unsophisticated shoppers. One mer-
chant rather cynically explained that the amount of goods sold a customer de-
pends not on the customer but on the merchant's willingness to extend him credit.
[Vol. I
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Door-to-Door Sales Techniques
Among the most prevalent techniques used to take advantage of the con-
sumer are the referral sale, the bait-and-switch sale, the "free" induce-
ment and the "fear" or "hard" sell-all in addition, of course, to the
usual guile and artifice found in the marketplace.26
The referral sale is a simple technique under which a salesman offers a
victim a chance to make back the purchase price of the item bought by
referring the salesman to other buyers. Strangely, the buyer never hears
of any of the referrals becoming buyers-at least not from the salesman.
If by some chance one of the referrals mentions his buying, the original
buyer must still prove that his referral was the source of the sale-no
mean feat, for most referrals involve neighbors who would usually be
visited by the salesman in any event.17
Realizing that a neighborhood has a limited number of people and
that multiple referral lists in the same neighborhood will produce over-
laps, a New York court concluded that a referring buyer will have an
impossible time producing a meaningful number of new customers. It
further noted that referrals by others will make it close to impossible to
prove that a particular buyer was the source of new sales. It concluded,
therefore, that the use of referral sales as inducements to buyers is
fraudulent in situations where the buyer is not told of his position in rela-
tion to other referring buyers. 8
The bait-and-switch technique, however, is still in full blossom. The
technique as used in home solicitation sales begins by advertising an
article at a low price. When the customer responds to the advertisement,
a salesman appears. He displays the article advertised which proves to
be a rather shoddy product. The salesman suggests an alternative prod-
uct of higher quality and price and then attempts to break down the
consumer's resistance, having the advantage of knowing that the cus-
tomer did want the type of product that the salesman is offering.
One of the more vicious techniques used is the "free" gift item. Often
a salesman offers a product with an inducement in the form of a "bonus
gift." The product itself tends to be so overpriced as to pay for the gift
and still provide a handsome profit.
A variant on this technique is to have the consumer buy some sort of
If the merchant is willing to accept great risk, he can sell the customer almost as
much as he cares to." Caplovitz, supra note 10, at 19.
26. See generally Cuming, supra note 19.
27. V. Morgan, The Home Solicitation Sale, Spring 1972 (unpublished con-
sumer credit study on file in Fordham Urban L.J. office).
28. State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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product and then allow him to rent storage or some sort of necessary
accessory. Eventually he finds he has been tricked into buying the acces-
sory as well. A well-known example is the meat supply service that
allows the customer to rent freezers to store the meat. Sometimes when
the customer decides he no longer wants the meat service or the freezer,
he finds that when he agreed to buy the meat, he also contracted to buy
the freezer.29
Instances of the "fear" and the "hard" sell are so varied in scope that
any description would only scratch the surface. The fear technique is
used most often in selling protection devices or alarm systems. The tech-
nique builds on an exaggerated fear induced by the salesman who exposes
the customer to the possible catastrophes that may be averted by the
purchase of the salesman's product. Faced with the full impact of this
designedly terrifying presentation, the consumer tends to overcompensate
by buying more protection than he needs-and paying less attention to
the quality of the merchandise he obtains.
The "hard sell" is simply any device that interferes with the buyer
giving full consideration to the various reasons for buying or not buying.
The salesman introduces to whatever extent possible a sense of duty on
the part of the buyer to reward the seller for his diligence. At the same
time the seller endeavors to establish a pressure of time and concurring
opinion of the part of others involved in the sale. Further, the seller ex-
hibits a dogged persistence and often an outright refusal to leave, once
inside, in an attempt to make agreement to the sale easier than not making
the agreement.
The Statutory Solutions
Faced with the abuses described above, the New York State Legisla-
ture created Article 10-A of the Personal Property Law. Entitled the
Home Solicitation Sales Act, Article 10-A attempts to protect the con-
sumer "subjected to high pressure door-to-door sales tactics." 0 It is
designed "[t]o afford consumers who sign contracts arising out of door-
to-door credit sales a three-day cooling-off period" to decide if they
actually want the goods. 81
First instituted in Great Britain, the idea of a cooling-off period has
spread throughout the United States. New York was one of the first states
29. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist.
Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1967).
30. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 425 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
31. Exec. Memo. [1970] McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y., 2899.
[Vol. I
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to provide for such a period of time to reconsider a sales agreement. 2
The National Consumers' Act (NCA) 3 and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) 4 have both included a provision allowing rescis-
sion of sales, and over 34 states have passed variants on the UCCC
form.5 It is, obviously, a readily acceptable idea.
The NCA differs in approach from both the New York act and the
UCCC (which the New York statute closely resembles). It assumes that
it is impossible for a consumer to make an independent decision when
faced with the various techniques of persuasion specified aboveY6 Thus
it requires not only that the buyer have a chance to rescind once a trans-
action is made, but also that he be given a period of time in which to
decide whether to buyY7
32. New York has been a leader in recent consumer legislation. The Council
of State Governments, Consumer Protection in the States 23 (1970).
33. National Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law School, National
Consumer Act §§ 2.501-.505 First Final Draft (1970) [hereinafter cited as NCA].
The NCA is still in draft stage, but it already resulted, in the promulgation of one
statute. See Wis. Stat. §§ 423-101 to -302 (Supp. 1972). Its new approaches, how-
ever, appear to provide great creative impetus in the area of consumer protection.
34. Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 2.501-.505 [hereinafter UCCC].
35. For those states which have adopted the UCCC, see Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 73-1-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1971); Idaho Code §§ 28-31-101 to -39-103 (Supp.
1971); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-1-101 to 6-202 (Supp. 1972); Okla.- Stat. tit. 14A,
§§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1972); Utah Code Ann. §§ 70B-1-101 to 9-103 (Supp.
1972); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1971). In addition, for
some variants on the Home Solicitation Sales Act based on the UCCC, see Alaska
Stat. § 45.05.125 (Supp. 1970); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-5001 to -5008
(Supp. 1972); Cal. Civ. §§ 1689.5 to -.13 (West Supp. 1972); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Rev. §§ 42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1969); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 4401-08 (Supp.
1971); D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3811 (Supp. 1971); Fla. Stat. §§ 501.021 to -.051
(1972); Ga. Code § 96-906 (Supp. 1972); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 476-5 (1968);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 /, § 262B (1969); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 367.410 to -.990
(Supp. 1972); La. Rev. Stat. § 27:11 (Supp. 1972); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§§ 4661-69 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, §§ 28-35 (Supp. 1972); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 48 & ch. 255D, § 9 (Supp. 1972); Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 445-111 to -117 (Supp. 1972); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 361B:1-3 (Supp.
1971); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 17:16C-61.1 to -61.9 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law §§ 425-30 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 25A-38 to -42
(Supp. 1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 83.710-.750 (1971); Pa. Stat. tit. 73, §§ 500-201
to -209 (Supp. 1971); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 6-28-1 to -28-8 (Supp. 1972);
S.D. Code §§ 37-24-3 to -5 (Supp. 1971); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2454 (1971);
Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-21.1 to -21.7 (Supp. 1972); Wash. Rev. Code § 63-14.154
(Supp. 1972).
36. NCA § 2.501, comment 1.
37. Id. §§ 2.501,.504.
1972]
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The Devices of Rescission
The difference in approach among the statutes manifests itself most
sharply in the various devices used to affect the validity of a sale. Under
the New York law, 8 if the sale is covered by the statute, the seller must
give the buyer a perforated card which specifies the buyer's rights. The
bottom half of the card must be usable as a postcard to notify the seller
of the cancellation of the saleY9 If the sale is made in a city of over one
million people, the perforated card must be printed in both English and
Spanish. 40
Once a sale is made and the card is given to the buyer, the buyer or
any other obligor41 may cancel the sale by sending the card or any other 2
written notice43 at any time "until midnight of the third business day after
the day on which the buyer has signed an agreement or offer to purchase
relating to such sale." 4 Such notice, if mailed, is presumed given "when
deposited in a mailbox properly addressed and postage prepaid. ' 45 If
the card is not provided at the time of the sale, the contract may be
voided until three days after the card is given to the buyer.46 Moreover,
it is at least arguable that notice need not be written until the card is
provided.47
The UCCC uses approximately the same device. The card specified in
this proposal acts solely as a notice of rights.48 In assisting the consumer
to give notice the card simply gives the address of the seller, specifies that
a mailed notice of cancellation must be sent to the seller, and that it
"must say that you do not want the goods or services .... ,4 The UCCC
is identical to the New York statute in its time requirements for cancella-
tion,50 the rule of mailing51 and the necessity of written notice. 2
38. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 428(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
39. Id.
40. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 428(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
41. "... . the buyer or any other person obligated for any part of the purchase
price may cancel a home solicitation sale .... " N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 427(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
42. Id. § 427(3) (i) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
43. Id. § 427(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
44. Id. § 427(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
45. Id. § 427(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
46. Id. § 428(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
47. Id.
48. UCCC § 2.503.
49. Id. § 2.503(2)(b).
50. Id. § 2.501(1).
51. Id. § 2.501(3).
52. Id. § 2.501(2).
[Vol. I234
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The NCA, however, treats the consumer quite differently. It distin-
guishes between a contract made at the seller's place of business and one
made at a buyer's home, place of work, or other area.53 Unlike the New
York statute or the UCCC, the NCA indicates that the buyer has a right
to rescind a transaction made at the seller's place of business. It also
contains a section requiring a notice specifying the buyer's right of the
rescission in such a transaction.54 The statute, however, appears not to
be carefully drawn. Such details as the return of merchandise and the
return of the consumer's money are left rather indefinite. 55 The notice,
however, gives the consumer rights in a sale at the place of business of
the merchant roughly equivalent to those given by the UCCC and the
New York act for sales at home."' It allows the consumer to sign and
date the notice itself, which, if mailed, acts as a notice of cancellation. 7
Once again, the three business day rule is used 58 as is the requirement of
written notice for cancellation of the sale.59 The proposal specifies the
option of forwarding the notice by telegraph, mail or personal delivery. 0
Both the UCCC61 and the New York statute62 apply solely to sales
that are both personally solicited by the seller and accepted by the buyer
at the residence of the buyer.61 The NCA divides transactions into those
occurring at the place of business of the seller and those occurring in
other places. 4 With regard to sales at the merchant's place of business,
the NCA provides the mechanisms of cancellation described above. For
53. NCA § 2.501.
54. Id. § 2.505(2).
55. Id. § 2.505(2)(b).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. UCCC § 2.501.
62. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 426(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
63. The UCCC, which also uses the language, "at a residence of the buyer,"
§ 2.501, points out that the usual expression, "in the residence . . ." would allow
the seller to have the buyer sign the contract outside thereby avoiding the strict
terminology of the statute. See UCCC § 2.501, comment 2. The comment is noted
herein to show the excruciating care that is needed in order to protect against the
attempt at evasions that will inevitably occur. Certainly there is sufficient allowable
variety in styles of doing business to permit the salesman, if he so desires, to evade
the precise descriptions so far set up. Once again one must hope that the courts
will not let the words of the statute obscure its intent.
64. NCA § 2.501.
1972]
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contracts made outside of the seller's place of business, however, the
NCA provides additional protection. 5 Predicated on the assumption that
a consumer "has not exercised full volition when being pressured in his
own home or away from a seller's place of business" 66 the NCA treats
all such sales as "sales on approval" 67 and thus demands that the con-
sumer affirm such a contract before he becomes obligated by it.
The seller must give the consumer written notice of the requirement
of affirmation,"8 but the notice gives no form for the letter of affirma-
tion. Once again, the notice must use language specifying the particular
subject matter of transaction. Affirmation is effective only when received
by the merchant.69
The Scope of the Statutes
The transactions covered by the various laws and proposals are gen-
erally similar. The "Home Solicitation Sale" is confined, in the New York
Act, to sales in which "the money, property, or service which is the sub-
ject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household
purposes. 7 °
The original UCCC is somewhat more specific. It does not include
farm equipment, and many of the states using the UCCC model also
exclude automobiles." It also includes land interests bought with large
credit charges. 72 New York ignores land sales. The NCA does not exclude
any type of goods or service. It specifically includes travelling loanmen. 73
The New York article does not apply if federal statutes would allow
cancellation.74 This provision applies primarily to the Federal Truth-in-
Lending Law75 and specifically to section 1635 (a) of the Act.76 Neither
65. Id. §§ 2.501-.504.
66. Id. § 2.501, comment 1.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 2.503.
69. Id. § 2.502(4).
70. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 426(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
71. UCCC § 2.501. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1689.5(c) (West Supp. 1972);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25A-38(5) (Supp. 1971).
72. Id. § 2.104(2)(b).
73. NCA § 2.505, comment.
74. N.Y. Pers. Prop, Law § 426(2)(b).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in
this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction in which a security
interest is retained or acquired in any real property which is used or is expected
to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor
shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business
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the NCA nor the UCCC have such an exception. This exception deals
with certain transactions in which a security interest on realty or on goods
to be fixed to the realty, is given as collateral for a credit transaction.
"Many items sold on retail installment sales agreements become a part
of realty. '17
The Home Solicitation Sales Act limits itself to sales payable in four
or more instalments.78 A lower court case7' has interpreted this limita-
tion to include those sales in which the buyer has the option of paying in
four or more instalments-not simply those in which the customer must
pay in that number.
The UCCC requires only that the transaction provide for instalments
or a credit service charge, 0 and that the amount of the payment price
that is financed is not greater than $25,000. s' The NCA does not require
either credit sales or instalments in order for a sale to fall under its
purview. It does, however, require that the total cost of a sale made at
the merchant's place of business exceed fifty dollars. 82
Since the criterion of four or more instalments is a prerequisite for a
transaction to fall under the New York Act, it is a tempting loophole for
those trying to avoid regulation. Moreover, there are many obvious pos-
sible evasions to circumvent the statutory criterion of instalment buying
that may be easily discovered by those seeking to deprive the consumer
of his rights. One obvious device would be to advance a "loan" to the
buyer so that he may pay for the product in full. The buyer then pays
off the loan in instalments. This artifice was anticipated by the legisla-
ture and was simply included as an alternative type of home solicitation
sale. 3 There is no doubt that other means will be found by resourceful
salesmen to circumvent the intent of the statute. A broad interpretation
day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the dis-
closures required under this section and all other material disclosures required
under this part, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with
regulations of the Board of his intention to do so. . . . The creditor shall also
provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, an adequate opportunity to
the obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section."
77. P. Fargo, Credit Insurance Gamesmanship, 56 A.B.A.J. 1187, 1190 n.12
(1970).
78. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 426(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
79. De Rouville v. E.F.G. Baby Prods. 67 Misc. 2d 508, 324 N.Y.S.2d 109
(Albany City Ct. 1971), afi'd, 69 Misc. 2d 252, 329 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Albany
County Ct. 1972).
80. UCCC § 2.104(1)(d).
81. Id. § 2.104(1)(e).
82. NCA § 2.501(1).
83. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 426(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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of the statutory language may be necessary to provide the consumer with
the protection intended by the legislature.
The NCA wisely avoids the use of instalments as a criterion for regula-
tion. Its sole interest is protecting the consumer against making purchases
which he had not planned to make."4 This type of purchase, of course, is
almost invariably made in home solicitation sales, for if one plans a pur-
chase, he tends to go to stores and compare prices. Since a travelling
salesman is not anticipated (unless, of course, he is requested) the sales
made by him are rarely planned.
The New York Act and the UCCC both specifically exclude transac-
tions "made pursuant to a preexisting revolving charge account, or pur-
suant to prior negotiations between the parties at a business establishment
at a fixed location where goods or services are offered or exhibited for
sale. ... "I There is no such limitation in the NCA.
The Effects of Cancellation
Within ten days after the card giving notice of cancellation prescribed
by the New York statute is mailed, the seller must return all payments,
notes or other evidence of debt, and any goods given to the seller as a
down payment.86 If the buyer's goods cannot be returned in substantially
the same condition, the buyer may elect to take the monetary trade-in
allowance given on the goods.17
Upon rescission, the seller is allowed to keep five per cent of the total
cash price of the transaction or the down payment, whichever is less.8
.If the seller has not returned the appropriate portion of the down pay-
ment within the requisite ten days, he is not entitled to keep any fee.89
Nor, of course, is he entitled to a fee under the act if the buyer's cancella-
tion is not based on the statute.
If the buyer successfully sues in court for down payment money un-
lawfully retained by the seller in excess of the allowed five per cent fee,
the major penalty clause in the Act90 vitiates the seller's right to a fee and
84. NCA § 2.501(1).
85. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 426(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972); See also UCCC
§ 2.501.
86. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 429(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
87. Id. § 429(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
88. Id. § 429(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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allows the buyer to recover damages, a $100 penalty and reasonable at-
torney's fees and costs.
Within a reasonable time after the notice of cancellation is mailed, the
seller may pick up the goods sold if he tenders whatever money or prop-
erty are owed to the buyer. 1 If, however, the seller has not fulfilled his
obligation to return such money or property, the buyer has a lien on the
goods in his possession and may retain them, but he must in all cases
take reasonably good care of them.92 If the seller has not picked up the
goods within forty days after the card is sent, the buyer obtains title to
them. 3 No additional fee may be had for services performed. 4 The
UCCC in this area is identical in substantive content to the provisions of
the Home Solicitation Sales Act.95
The NCA, however, differs in both the procedure to be followed by the
parties and the sanctions to be applied if a party is delinquent in its du-
ties. In the sale in which an affirmation is required (i.e. all eligible sales
made outside of the merchant's place of business), a seller must abide by
the terms of the transaction for three business days after the notice is
given.9 6
Once the seller knows or can reasonably conclude that the buyer will
not affirm the transaction, he must return whatever money and property
have been advanced by the consumer before he may reclaim the goods
sold.97 If a seller fails to tender whatever property the buyer advanced
for its trade-in value, the consumer will have the right to "elect to re-
cover an amount equal to the greater of the trade-in allowance or fair
market value. '9 8
The NCA treatment of the right to cancel a transaction made in a
store99 is by no means as complete as either its treatment of sales made
outside the merchant's place of business or the treatment given such sales
in New York's Home Solicitation Sales Act. There is, for example, no
specification of the procedure by which rescission is to take place. The
NCA, however, does set out penalties for violation of its various sections.
Predicated on a figure termed the transaction total-the sum of the cost
91. Id. § 430 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
92. Id. § 430(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
93. Id. § 430(l) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
94. Id. § 430(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
95. UCCC § 2.504.
6. NCA § 2.502(2).
"7. Id. § 2.504(1).
93. Id. § 2.504(2).
99. Id. 2.505.
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of the goods or service plus the financing charge'---different violations
incur liability for varying percentages of the total.' If the seller fails to
notify the buyer of either the right of rescission or the need of affirma-
tion, he acquires a liability, in addition to actual damages, of a penalty
amounting to either ten per cent of the transaction1 total or one hundred
dollars-whichever is the greater." 2 A failure to provide notice of the
need of an affirmation also allows the consumer "to retain the goods,
services or money received pursuant to the transaction without obligation
to pay any part of the transaction total for violations to which this sec-
tion applies. In addition, he is entitled to recover any sums paid to the
creditor or merchant pursuant to the transaction.' 03
A failure on the part of the seller to return any goods or money due a
consumer after the latter's refusal to affirm a transaction gives the cus-
tomer a right to recover actual and punitive damages plus thirty per cent
of the transaction total or $300, whichever is greater.0 4
A major exception to the purview of the New York law,' the
UCCC00 and the NCA °7 is a provision exempting the seller from the
requirements of notice and the consumer from the corresponding rights
he normally would enjoy under the statutes in situations in which the
seller receives a request of the consumer to perform immediately due
to an "emergency" and the seller complies. Thus if a buyer demands
that the seller provide a sewing machine immediately because the buy-
er's old machine broke down and the buyer had to finish the sewing, the
rescission period would not be available unless the goods could be re-
turned in "substantially the same" condition as they were when re-
ceived.' "Substantially the same" becomes a matter of factual interpre-
tation and the burden of proof would more likely fall on the consumer
requesting the goods than on the good faith supplier. With respect to
services there is of course no opportunity for any return. It should be
noted that the statutes contain no definition of the word "emergency."
It was the intent of the authors of the UCCC "to protect the seller who in
100. Id. § 5.301(3).
101. Id. § 5.302-.304.
102. Id. § 5.302.
103. Id. § 5.305.
104. Id. § 5.304.
105. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 427(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
106. UCCC § 2.502(5).
107. NCA §§ 2.502(6), 2.505(1).
108. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 427(5) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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good faith relies on the statement of the buyer that an emergency exists
and who performs immediately at the request of the buyer. 109
Given the undefined aspect of the "emergency" exception, there ap-
pears to be great danger of exploitation by the seller. It may prove neces-
sary to provide that actual emergencies be evidenced by a written request
from the buyer if the assertion of emergency appears to be unduly wide-
spread. Certainly the section may be easily adapted to correct resultant
inequities.
There are many problems to be faced with the present New York
statute. Acting to cure a specific symptom of a much larger problem,
the statute is so qualified as to invite evasion. Even to the most educated,
literate and sophisticated consumer, the information presented as a re-
sult of this statute at best invites more questions than it answers. 110 To
a less sophisticated low income consumer, however, the statute is even
more upsetting. Not only is the notice insufficient and the concept con-
fusing,"' but the statute ignores the traditional style of marketing in
which the poor do their business.
It must also be remembered that the alienation incurred by the poor
could create an inability, and, to some extent, an unwillingness to make
use of the lawyer and the legal system." 2 Moreover, the enforcement of
law takes place during the day-often in itself an impossible burden
109. UCCC § 2.502, comment. A related question, beyond the scope of this
comment to treat, concerns the respective positions of the buyer and seller should
the goods be destroyed while in the possession of the buyer during the "cooling-
off" period.
110. A Yale Law School study (Note, A Case Study of the Impact of
Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-
Off Period, 78 Yale L.J. 618 (1969)) of the Connecticut Home Solicitation Sales
Act, which at the time gave only a one-day rescission period (Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. §§ 42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1972-73)), reached the "firm conclusion . . . that
a cooling-off period of such short length benefits consumers very little .... This
conclusion is further corroborated by Legal Aid lawyers who say that since the
Act was passed they have had no clients seek advice within the cooling-off period."
78 Yale L.J. at 628-29. The rescission period has subsequently been extended to
three business days (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-135 (Supp. 1972-73)), "but this
marginal increase is not likely to have a major effect on consumers or dealers."
78 Yale L.J. at 630.
111. P.G. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Legisla-
tion, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 119-20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schrag]; see also
Caplovitz, supra note 10, at 19.
112. In a test question to heads of poor households, 64% of the people asked
did not know where to get help if cheated by a merchant. Caplovitz, supra note
10, at 175. See also note 101 and accompanying text supra.
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for one whose salary is barely sufficient to provide a living for self and
family. 113 The cost of an attorney may likewise be sufficiently prohibitive
to make any recourse to the law unthinkable.14
We have already seen that the low income consumer is not the rational
buyer as envisioned in economic texts. Unfortunately, however, a legis-
lature often:
presupposes a consumer -equipped to deal with the business community on at least
equal terms. This consumer has three essential characteristics:
(1) He knows that he should and wants to shop around for best buys when
purchasing goods and services.
(2) He is competent to decide which product offers the greatest value for the
least money.
(3) He knows his legal rights (and liabilities) in the event of a post-sale legal
conflict with the seller, and is prepared to use all available tools in such a
conflict.
Only such consumers can avoid repeated "bad buys" and insure the competition
among businessmen which keeps prices at a reasonable level while assuring con-
tinued high quality." 5
New York likewise views the consumer as a rational buyer:
In order to encourage buyers to be careful in signing contracts tendered by
door-to-door salesmen the [New York statute permits] the seller to retain up to
5% of the sales price as a cancellation fee. While it is arguable that this provision
might encourage sellers to require down payments, that result would not neces-
sarily be undesirable. Requiring a buyer to put up some money may in itself force
him to reflect upon the wisdom of the transaction.11
This reasoning, while applicable to the sophisticated consumer, bears
little relation to actual patterns of buying of the low income consumer.
Instead of looking for the best buy, the poor look for the dealer who will
extend the most credit or provide in their repeated transactions a sense
of security for the family. 1 7 There is no assurance that they will be able
113. Limited protection is available. See Schrag, supra note 111, at 133.
114. "The number of consumers having no redress because the amount lost is
not commensurate with the attorney's fee constitutes the vast majority." Comment,
Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Pro-
tection, 114 U.Pa. L. Rev. 395, 409 (1966). ". . . even with virtually unlimited
economic resources, a [consumer] test-case lawyer is in trouble in New York
courts.... I have just spent an entire year working on six cases." Schrag, supra
note 111, at 155.
115. The Poor, supra note 7, at 748 (footnote omitted).
116. Exec. Memo. [1970], McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y., 2899-2900.
117, $e Dower, FTC National Consumer Protection Hearings 360-61 (1968).
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to engage in any transaction, and so there is no attempt to control the
quality of the item. The only question is how can the consumer get the
goods he wants; the cost will be considered later.118
It is difficult to establish overall norms for buyer behavior, for various
groups have different goals in their buying. The low income consumer in
a "traditional" marketplace attempts to foster a sense of security in his
existence by buying from established "friends" rather than allowing the
value offered by competing merchants to establish who the parties will
be."' He accepts poor quality merchandise at exorbitant prices as the
cost of attempting to make society appear stable by dealing with "friends"
and of acquiring the goods that will allow him to achieve some
degree of self-esteem through his purchases.' At the same time, legal
expenses and the demands of litigation act as overwhelming obstacles
to the poor contemplating a lawsuit.'
It is incumbent upon society, therefore, to insure that those with whom
the poor choose to deal do not operate completely beyond the scope of
proper entrepreneurial behavior' 12 2 One possible mechanism to that end
is to license all individuals acting as sellers or agents of sellers in home
solicitation sales. The Home Solicitation Sales Act does not eliminate
the need for licensing of door-to-door salesmen primarily because the
power to correct unwise transactions is, as has been seen, not useful to
those who do not have the requisite training, background or financial
resources.
123
Licensing of door-to-door salesmen has fallen into disrepute, mainly
because of the difficulty in defining the individuals to be licensed. Defin-
ing the individual in terms of the activity still leaves the activity subject
to evasion, but the activity is at least more readily defined.
Finally, the failure to obtain a license need not result in criminal sanc-
tions, for the law is loathe to prosecute a businessman doing what is
118. Caplovitz, supra note 10, at 173-74.
119. See note 25 supra.
120. Caplovitz, supra note 10, at 12-13, 19-20.
121. See note 114 supra.
122. In fact, "since Hammurabi's written code of law, organized societies have
recognized the need to provide the consumer with legislative protection from the
unscrupulous seller or lender." Note, New Consumer Credit Reforms in Illinois,
17 De Paul L. Rev. 194 (1967) (footnote omitted).
123. Contra, Opinions of the State Comptroller of the State of New York
71-164, in N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 425 (McKinney 1972), comment.
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thought to be his job,"' but failure to obtain a license might simply be
treated as is the failure to give a card to a buyer-the buyer can always
pull out.
It may be argued that the expense to sellers and government alike
would be prohibitive. Certainly there would be a high cost of keeping
information current, but the amount of money saved by the low income
consumer, and thus by social welfare agencies throughout the state,
might easily provide the funds, and a major weapon in the fight against
poverty as well.
It is a well-known phenomenon that the poor do not trust the law.
In fact, it has often been used to protect the seller.'25
... Robert F. Kennedy ... insist[ed] that the "poor man looks upon the law as
an enemy. . . ' For him the law is always taking something away." Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach . . . puts it that, "To us, law and regulations are protections and
guides, established for our benefit, and for us to use. But to the poor, they are a
hostile maze, established as harassment, at all costs to be avoided." 126
Thus, in a large sample of heads of black households taken in Newark,
87 per cent of those who felt they had been victims of illegal racial dis-
crimination did not apply to any agency for redress. Leonard Zeitz notes:
Probes elicited these typical comments:
"You can't do nothing. Just hope men will change."
124. B. Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 717, 779 (1968).
125. The Holder-in-Due-Course doctrine is one example of the unfair dis-
advantage to which an unsophisticated consumer may be subjected by the work-
ings of a complicated law. Based on ancient principles of trade law, the doctrine
states that the buyer of negotiable commercial paper is not liable for circumstances
making its payment unfair if he is not warned of the circumstances before he
buys the paper. N.O. Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The
Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 48 (1966). "The social evils
flowing from negotiability in this circumstance have become manifest, and there
has been a clear trend in both the courts and the legislatures toward amelioration
of its consequences. In particular, the unfairness to the poorest members of the
community of the law governing consumer instalment purchases has generated
a reaction that is giving rise to a major alteration in it. This departure is being
accomplished ... by legislative action forbidding the use of negotiable instruments
in consumer instalment transactions and by judicial attempts to stretch the facts to
deny holder in due course status to finance companies." A. Rosenthal, Negotia-
bility-Who Needs It?, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 379-80 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
By statute in New York, the holder in due course defense, in cases of consumer
transactions not dealing with home improvements, was eliminated. N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law § 403 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
126. L. Miller, supra note 1, at 386.
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"Mister, I don't go where I'm not wanted."
"You can't prove nothing, so why try."
"I just don't want no trouble. '127
It is necessary, therefore, in order effectively to protect the poor con-
sumer, that he be saved from the inequities that do result from the su-
perior resources and expertise possessed by the salesmen. The day's pay
that a consumer may lose testifying while defending himself against a
claim might often be a greater proportionate drain on his income than a
full day's attorney's fee on the company claiming the debt.
A desirable alternative, therefore, is to use the idea of the Home So-
licitation Sales Act to protect a consumer by forcing a degree of educa-
tion on him, and then giving him a chance to use this knowledge in
evaluating, and to a degree controlling, his own transaction.
To this end, it is suggested that at the very least, an affirmation similar
to that contained in the NCA be required-perhaps in the consumer's
own handwriting-as one of the items to be pleaded and proved in any
claim. The salient information may be included on the affirmation or
as an additional part of the specified affirmation form. If no such affirma-
tion.exists, no claim would be allowed.
The draw of easy credit will not be so easily curbed, but will linger
until the poor have equal access to the more conventional forms of
credit. Until that time arrives when access to credit does occur, it is in
the best interest of both the consumer and the state as well, to protect
him from the abuses to which he is so prone.
A proposal for a licensing statute appears in the Appendix hereto.
It will provide a view of the myriad constructive possibilities afforded the
legislator in this area. Thus, sections of the proposed statute treat not
only those problems specifically discussed herein, but also other related
dissatisfactions with home solicitation sales as currently practiced.
APPENDIX
There shall be added to the Personal Property Law a new article to be
numbered Article 10-B which reads as follows:
§ 441. Short title; purpose.
This act may be cited as the Consumer Transaction Protection Act.
The purpose of this act is to afford consumers a more trustworthy market-
place in consumer transactions.
127. L. Zeitz, Survey of Negro Attitudes Toward Law, 19 Rutgers L. Rev.
288, 295 (1965).
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Comment: Complete protection for the poor consumer cannot be obtained until
he is fully integrated into the credit system and thereby into the more complex
dynamics of the marketplace at large. This integration, however, is occurring at a
very slow pace. It is necessary, therefore, to introduce palliative measures to lessen
the impediments to this integration.
§ 442. Definitions.
In this article:
1. "The subject of the transaction" means that money, property or
service for which money or a promise therefor is given by a purchaser
or borrower.
2. "Consumer transaction" means any transaction made outside of
the seller's place of business wherein the subject of the transaction is
primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
3. "Seller" means any person, copartnership or corporation which
participates or intends to participate in over twenty-five consumer trans-
actions per year or more than five consumer transactions per week as
the performer of services or the previous owner of the subject of the
transaction, or an agent, distributor or consignee of such owner or per-
former. 2 '
4. "Buyer" means any natural person who participates in a consumer
transaction with a seller and who is a recipient of the subject of the
transaction.
5. "Consumer transaction format" means the parameters of the price,
the terms and the financing methods to be used in a consumer trans-
action, the exact description of the subject matter of the transaction and
the quantity thereof to be sold or loaned, and the dates of the beginning
and the ending of the period during which the type of the consumer
transaction will take place. 2 '
6. "Unconscionable trade practice" means any act or practice in
connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan or in connection with the
offering for sale, lease, rental or loan of any consumer goods or services,
or in the extension of consumer credit, or in the collection of consumer
128. This definition is derived from the definitions of "real estate broker" and
"real estate salesman" found in New York statute law. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 440
(McKinney 1968). The number of sales used as criteria for determining the seller
is, of course, arbitrary and may easily be adjusted.
129. This concept is new. Since the proposal seeks to regulate activities rather
than simply people, it must provide a mechanism for discovering exactly what are
the activities planned by the seller.
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debts which unfairly takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,
experience or capacity of a consumer; or results in a gross disparity be-
tween the value received by a consumer and the price paid, to the con-
sumer's detriment; provided that no act or practice shall be deemed un-
conscionable under this act unless declared unconscionable and described
with reasonable particularity in a state law, local ordinance, or in a rule
or regulation promulgated by the Attorney General. In promulgating
such rules and regulations, the Attorney General shall consider, among
other factors: (1) knowledge by merchants engaging in the act or prac-
tice of the inability of consumers to receive properly anticipated benefits
from the goods or services involved; (2) gross disparity between the
price of goods or services and their value measured by the price at which
similar goods or services are readily obtained by other consumers; (3)
the fact that the acts or practices may enable merchants to take advantage
of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their interests by rea-
son of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand
the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of education, or similar
factors; (4) the degree to which terms of the transaction require con-
sumers to waive legal rights; (5) the degree to which terms of the trans-
action require consumers to jeopardize money or property beyond the
money or property immediately at issue in the transaction; and (6) defi-
nitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations, rulings and decisions
of legislative or judicial bodies in this state or elsewhere. 130
Comment: By promulgating precise definitions of unconscionable practices, both
legislatively and administratively, a broader scope of consumer protection, freer
from abuse by circumvention, may be afforded.
§ 443. License required for sellers in consumer transactions.
No person, copartnership or corporation shall act as a seller in a con-
sumer transaction without first procuring a license therefor as provided
in this article. 3 '
Comment: It is contemplated that it will most often be necessary for both a sales-
130. This definition closely parallels the definition found in the New York
City Charter ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203-2.0(b) (Supp. 1971). The city statute is pred-
icated upon the leadership of a Commissioner of Consumer Affairs. It would, of
course, be possible to use an equivalent commissioner in New York State. There
are certain advantages to be obtained in giving one department the option of tak-
ing effective legal action in court and exercising the powers of a licensing agency.
131. This section is derived from N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 440-a (McKinney
1968).
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man and his employer to make application for licenses. It is not unusual to find
that the salesman who declares himself an agent of a company on Monday morn-
ing as he sells his wares is no longer in the company's employ on Tuesday when
his product is found to be defective. It is, therefore, necessary to insure stability
on the part of both the salesman and the firm he represents.
§ 444. Application for license.
1. Any person, copartnership or corporation desiring to act as a seller
in a consumer transaction on or after , shall file with the office
of the Attorney General an application for a license to participate in con-
sumer transactions with a specific consumer format.
2. A separate application shall be filed for each consumer transaction
format to be used by the seller.
3. The application shall set forth, in such detail and in such form as
the Attorney General shall prescribe, the following:
A. The name and residence of the applicant, and if an individual,
the name under which he intends to conduct business. If the applicant
is a copartnership the name and residence address of each member
thereof and the name under which the business is to be conducted; or,
if the applicant is a corporation, the name and address of the corpora-
tion and the name and residence address of each of its officers.
B. The places where the business is to be conducted. Each city,
town or village is to be specified.
C. The business or occupation theretofore engaged in by the ap-
plicant, or if a copartnership, by each member thereof, or, if a corpo-
ration, by each officer thereof, for a period of two years immediately
preceding the date of such application, setting forth the place or places
where such business or occupation was engaged in and the name or
names of employers, if any.
D. The prior criminal record, if any, of the applicant, or if a cor-
poration, of each officer thereof, or, if a copartnership, of each mem-
ber thereof.
E. A statement of each consumer transaction format to be used by
the seller.
F. If the applicant is an agent, the names and addresses of the
employer; if an employer, the names and addresses of all employees
acting as sellers.
G. Each application for a license under this act shall be sub-
scribed by the applicant, or an officer or a member thereof, and
affirmed as true by the subscriber under the penalties of perjury.
H. Submitted with the application is to be a fee determined by the
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Attorney General to be sufficient to cover the costs of processing and
inspection. 132
Comment: This section is the anchor of the proposed act. It is hoped that the
Attorney General, armed with the information provided by this application and
his own experience in the area, will be able to deduce the true nature of the trans-
action applied for and will be able to use his knowledge to eliminate the more
blatantly unfair practices before they invade the marketplace.
§ 445. Granting the license.
The Attorney General may at his discretion grant licenses for all con-
sumer transactions of services and merchantable goods which are not
unconscionable. The license will be valid, if issued, for the period of time
requested, as long as all consumer transaction formats and other infor-
mation are accurate.
Comment: It is to be stressed that the criteria of unconscionability established in
Section 442(6) of this act are to be considered indicia of acceptability, but that
the determination of the Attorney General need not be limited to such criteria.
There is provided in the statute a means for the Attorney General, through use of
his rule-making power, to eliminate unmerchantable products from the market.
"Merchantability" is defined in N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314 (McKinney 1964).
§ 446. Affirmation.
1. In a commercial transaction initiated by the seller and consum-
mated outside of the seller's place of business, in which the dollar amount
the buyer pays, will pay, has paid or is obligated to pay exceeds fifty
dollars, the buyer is not obligated under the transaction until he has
affirmed the transaction in writing.
2. The seller is bound to the terms of the agreement reached until
midnight of the third business day after the agreement is reached.
3. The seller must provide the consumer with a statement of his need
to affirm the transaction. The statement must:
A. Appear under the caption: "BUYER'S NEED TO AFFIRM
THE TRANSACTION" printed in eight point type; ,,
B. read as follows: "If you were first contacted by the seller or
if this agreement was completed by the seller at a place other than
his place of business and you wish to go through with the transaction,
you must tell the seller by a letter in order to be obligated. The seller
may not change the terms or avoid the transaction for three business
132. This section is derived from N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 441 (McKinney
1968).
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days after you receive this notice. The letter must be mailed to: (name
and address of seller)."
C. If the agreement was consummated in a city of a population of
over a million, the above statement must be in both Spanish and
English.
D. Until the seller complies with subsection (3) of this section,
any affirmation made by the buyer is revocable by him.
4. Affirmation occurs when the buyer gives or mails written notice of
affirmation to the seller at the address stated in the notice required in
subsection (3) of this section.
5. Notice of affirmation need not take a particular form and is suffi-
cient if it indicates by any form of written expression the intention of
the buyer to affirm the transaction.
Comment: This section is an adaptation of NCA §§ 2.502 and 2.503. It is envi-
sioned in the operation of this section that sellers will not readily deliver goods
without affirmation from the buyer. The $50 amount is intended to qualify the
transaction in terms of its importance to the buyer, so that his concern for the
amount in question will overcome his predictable disregard due to inertia for the
affirmation procedure. The possibility of creating a large residue of returned, used
goods is such that consideration should be given to limiting the applicability of
this section to transactions in which no delivery is scheduled within the three-day
period.
§ 447. Conformity with the consumer transaction format statement.
The Attorney General may, by appropriate means, insure that the
consumer transactions conform to the statement of the consumer transac-
tion format. Non-conforming transactions create no obligation on the
part of the buyer. Any proposed change in the consumer transaction that
would materially vary the registered consumer transaction format must
be submitted to the Attorney General, together with a full justification
and explanation of the proposed change, which must be approved by the
Attorney General under the licensing procedures of this Act. Any
change in the transaction format which is not approved shall be deemed
non-conforming.
Comment: The requirement of an approval by the Attorncy General provides a
strict regulation for variances in the consumer transaction format as originally
registered with the Attorney General. A transaction made in conformity with a
new consumer transaction format for which an application has been made is not
deemed conforming with a registered format until approval has been given by the
Attorney General. It therefore creates no obligation for the buyer.
It may also be possible to achieve substantially the same protection while not
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requiring express approval by the Attorney General by empowering him to issue
rejections of proposed changes within a statutory period of time.
§ 448. Revocation of the license by the Attorney General.
The Attorney General may upon ten days' notice revoke a license for
cause, including, but not limited to, material viriations from the con-
sumer transaction format, and may require a list of all buyers with whom
the seller dealt from thirty days prior to the date of the revocation.
§ 449. Pleading.
In any suit filed against a buyer, a seller must allege upon knowledge
and prove that the consumer transaction was licensed, that it conformed
to the consumer transaction format as stated in the license application,
and that, if required, it was affirmed.
§ 450. Sanctions.
1. An intentional deviation from the transaction format on the part
of the seller, if material, entitles the buyer to triple damages.
2. Any material deviation from the statement of consumer format
entitles the buyer to attorney's fees.
3. Any merchandise delivered to a buyer as a result of a transaction
not conforming with the statement of consumer format is to be considered
the property of the buyer without any claim on the part of the seller.
Comment: Sections 448, 449, and 450 act as the enforcement articles of the
statute. It is not sufficient merely to allow the seller to settle those transactions
which bring on litigation by doing what was promised in the first place. There is
simply too little advantage to acting responsibly from the outset. At the same
time, the opportunity to threaten legal involvement is not practicable for a buyer
who is not versed in the law and who does not have the time or the' resources to
carry out his suit. It is hoped that these sections will, to some extent combine the
best of both worlds; thus, the litigious may sue while those not so inclined may be
protected from overreaching sellers.
